Due Process and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment Clause by Ogg, Randall
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 3 Article 5
Spring 1977
Due Process and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment
Clause
Randall Ogg
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ogg, Randall (1977) "Due Process and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment Clause," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 52 : Iss. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol52/iss3/5
Notes
Due Process and the Automatic Fuel
Adjustment Clause
Utility regulation and rapidly rising utility rates' have been subjects of
increasing controversy in recent years.2 One of the most controversial
aspects of utility regulation is the "fuel adjustment clause," under which
utilities pass rising fuel costs to their consumers without the prior approval
of the. state regulatory commission.3
The rate schedules of public utilities are ordinarily creatures of.the
regulatory process. Typically a state utility commission sets rates upon the
basis of the utility's cost of production and investment, allowing a return
on investment comparable to that earned by other businesses with
corresponding risks. The determination is made on the basis of evidence
presented during a public hearing, and changes in the rate schedule
ordinarily cannot be made in the absence of such a hearing.4 However, a
'In 1974 alone, electric power rates nationwide increased by an average of 55 percent.
See Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., June 19, 1975, at 23.2For recent criticism of utility regulation in the United States, see R. MORGAN & S.
JERABEK, How To CHALLENGE YOUR LOCAL UTILITY (1974); Metcalf, The Fuel Adjustment
Clause, 120 CONG. REC. E6529 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1974); The Fuel Adjustment Caper, 39
CONSUMER REP. 837 (1974).
sThe focus of this note is on the automatic fuel adjustment procedure that operates
outside the regulatory process. This procedure allows the utility to increase rates with every
billing period without any form of prior approval from the state utility commission.
However, a few state legislatures or their state utility commissions have initiated fuel
adjustment procedures that are subject to commission review and prior hearing, and as such,
do not raise the constitutional questions which are the central subject of this note. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE § 8-1-2-42(b) (1976) (fuel adjustment only after prior hearing). California, Montana,
New Jersey and Florida have procedures similar to that of Indiana.
States where the fuel adjustment appears to operate without a prior hearing include:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
For a discussion of the operation of fuel adjustment in each state, see Trigg, Escalator
Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964 (1958). See also 74 Op. Ar'y
GEN. FLA. 309 (1974).
The fuel adjustment clause may be expressly authorized by statute. See, e.g., IND. CODE
§ 8-1-2-42(b) (1976). Most often, the clause is adopted by the state regulatory agency pursuant
to its general ratemaking powers. See Note, The Fuel Adjustment Clause and Its Role in the
Regulatory Process, 47 Miss. L.J. 302, 307 (1976).4There has long been uncertainty as to whether ratemaking is an exercise of state power
that requires a hearing. In Morgan v, United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), the Supreme Court
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utility with a fuel adjustment clause incorporated into its rate schedule5 is
allowed to increase its rates without following the normal ratemaking
procedures. The fuel adjustment clause, in effect, allows the rate schedule
to be altered outside the administrative process and in the absence of public
participation. 6
The proponents of the automatic fuel adjustment clause maintain that
it is the most efficient method of coping with rapidly increasing fuel costs.'
It is argued that one of the purposes of fuel adjustment is to reduce the
held that because ratemaking involves a determination of what rates are just and reasonable,
the setting of rates by an administrative agency is a quasi-judicial exercise requiring a fair
hearing. Morgan further held that quasi-judicial ratemaking proceedings must provide for
the "taking and weighing of evidence, determinations of fact based upon the consideration of
the evidence, and the making of an order supported by such findings ... " Id. at 480. One year
later in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937), the Court held that
because utility regulatory commissions have been delegated such broad discretionary powers
in ratemaking, the fourteenth amendment requires a fair hearing to decide most ratemaking
matters. Despite these two cases, several state courts have found that ratemaking is a
legislative determination which does not require a public hearing. See, e.g., Wood v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823 (1971).
The most recent Supreme Court expression on the subject is found in United States v.
Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), which apparently limits the scope of Morgan.
A divided Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, held that the Interstate Commerce
Commission was not required to hold an adjudicative-type hearing prior to the fixing of
railroad rates that were to be national in scope. The Court noted that the ratemaking by the
Commission involved factual inferences "apparent to anyone" and that it was an exercise of
"basically legislative-type judgment" not involving an adjudication of a particular set of
disputed facts. Id. at 246. However, the Court did imply that any ratemaking determinations
"designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases" must be done pursuant to an
adjudicative hearing. Id. at 245.
The setting of rates for electric utilities is distinguishable from the method that is
employed to set national railroad rates. Unlike the determination of railroad rates, which
primarily involves policy judgments and undisputed facts, there are numerous factual
controversies surrounding the setting of utility rates, including the valuation of the utility's
investment, the various costs that are reasonably incurred to render service, and the
appropriate rate of return on the investment. See generally C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION (rev. ed. 1969). Because disputable facts are common to such ratemaking, the
Florida East Coast decision would seem to compel an adjudicative hearing prior to setting
utility rates, While the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed this issue since Ohio Bell,
this note will proceed on the assumption that ratemaking for electric utilities involves the
adjudication of disputed facts, and that consequently, rates must be set pursuant to an
adjudicative hearing.5A typical fuel adjustment formula may read:
Whenever the weighted average cost of fuel is greater or less than 27.00 per million
JTU by any amount, there shall be a corresponding increase or decrease per
kilowatt-hour billed at the rate of 0.0121C . . . for each 1.000 per million BTU
departure from said standard cost, adjusted to the nearest 0.0005C.
See City of Evansville v. Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., - Ind. App. -, 339 N.E.2d 562,
591 (1976).6See note 3 supra.
71t is not the purpose of this note to offer the complete set of economic justifications for
fuel adjustment but rather to analyze the procedural framework for its implementation. The
substantive case for fuel adjustment is adequately made elsewhere. See, e.g., Schiffel, Electric
Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL FORT., June 19,
1975; Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964 (1958).
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number of costly formal rate hearings8 and to meet the adverse economic
incidents of "regulatory lag."9
The use of the fuel adjustment clause has not escaped criticism. It is
argued that the use of the fuel adjustment clause functions as a disincentive
to the economical operation and purchase of fuel supplies by the utility
since it may fully recover any costs it incurs.1 0 Other criticisms of the fuel
adjustment clause are that it represents an abdication of the state's
regulatory function," has an inflationary effect upon the economy, results
in undesirably frequent changes in the rate schedules, ignores other
ratemaking factors, such as competition and public benefit, usually
considered by a utility commission in setting rates, and segregates and
emphasizes one factor in ratemaking while ignoring possible savings and
efficiencies that may have occurred in othe portions of the utility's
operation.' 2 A final criticism, the focus of this note, is that the increase in
rates without a hearing violates the consumers' right to a prior hearing as
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 3
THE PROPERTY INTEREST
The initial question is whether the due process clause has any relevance
to the adjustment of utility prices. The requirements of procedural due
8Sarikas, What Is New in Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 34.
9See In re Lynchburg Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 33, 35-36 (Va. 1954):
When prices are rising, the time that necessarily elapses between the date when
earnings fall below the permissible minimum rate of return and the date when the
commission enters its order allowing increased rates, is a time which the utility
earns less than a fair and reasonable return.
The inevitable delay between the happening of an event that entitles a party to
legal relief and the date when he gets relief makes it impossible in some kind of
cases for law and equity to do complete justice.
10This argument is based on the assumption that since the utility is allowed to pass on
the total cost of fuel automatically, utilities may purchase expensive fuel or allow its
procurement expenses to increase without corresponding decreases in profits. It assumes that
the fuel adjustment clause allows the utility to operate on a "cost-plus" basis insulating the
utility from normal business risks by shifting all the risks of utility business onto the
consumer. See The Fuel Adjustment Caper, 39 CONSUMER REP. 836, 839 (1974).
Others argue that there is no strong .disincentive to utilities to bargain over fuel costs
passed on by the fuel adjustment clause. See, e.g., Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An
Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 26.
"The use of automatic fuel adjustment delegates ratemaking power to private parties;
delegation of power to private bodies who may exercise that power to their own advantage has
been found to be constitutionally objectionable. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936); Blementhal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal.2d 228, 368 P.2d 101 (1962);
State v. Allstate Ins. Co., 231 Miss. 869, 97 So.2d 372 (1957).
The constitutionality of this delegation to utilities is beyond the scope of this note; for a
survey of the constitutional issues raised by delegation to private parties, see Liebman,
Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975).
12See In re Southern Calif. Edison Co., 94 P.U.R.3d 252, 257-58 (Calif. 1972).
"3U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1, states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
19771
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process apply only to deprivations of interests encompassed by the
fourteenth amendment's protection of "liberty and property."' 4 Before a
due process analysis may properly proceed, it must be determined whether
utility consumers have a cognizable "property" interest in anything
affected by the use of the fuel adjustment clause.'5
Recent doctrinal developments demonstrate that the concept of prop-
erty is no longer confined to the traditional categories of "real estate,
chattels, or money.' 6 Today the concept of property encompasses such
varied interests as "reasonable expectations,"' 17 statutory rights,' the
pursuit of a trade,' 9 educational benefits20 and the use of property.2'
However, to have a cognizable property interest the individual must have
"more than an abstract need or desire for it; ' 22 one must also have a
"legitimate claim of entitlement to it.''23
One source of cognizable property interests to which a person may
claim entitlement is a state statute conferring valuable social benefits. 24 As
part of their regulatory schemes most states have enacted statutes which
guarantee to the utility consumer the right to fair and reasonable utility
rates. 25 The increase in rates by the use of the fuel adjustment clause
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
14See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
"
5The standard for determining the existence of such an interest was set out in Board of
Regents v. Roth:
But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we
must look not to the "weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must
look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
and property.
408 U.S. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
I61d. at 572.
17Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (expectation of continued public employment
as a teacher).
18See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (right to welfare benefits granted by state
statute).
19See Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (right of a
certified public accountant to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals); Freitag v. Carter, 489
F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (right to obtain a chauffeur's license); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964) (right to obtain a retail liquor license to sell).
20See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
21See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (right to the use of personal property pending
hearing).22Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
23/d.
24See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). An individual's state statutory benefit has
found constitutional protection in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification for
unemployment compensation), and in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (discharge from
public employment).25See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 48, § 52 (Supp. 1973); ARMZ. REv. STAT § 40-361(A) (1974); CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21 (West Supp. 1975-76); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 65-518 (Supp. 1976).
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involves state action26 that may adversely affect these important statutory
rights. Specifically, the mistaken, unjustified or fraudulent application of
the fuel adjustment clause27 to raise the consumers' utility rates has the
effect of forcing them to pay "unfair and unreasonable" rates28 in
degradation of their property interest in fair and reasonable rates.
The due process clause has been often used to protect against the
wrongful deprivation of state statutory benefits. In Goldberg v. Kelly29 the
Supreme Court held that welfare recipients were entitled to a hearing
before termination of welfare payments despite the fact that the recipients
had not shown that they were in fact entitled under the statute to the
payments.3 0 The Court held that the due process clause demands a
predeprivation hearing at which the welfare recipient is given an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate his entitlement under the statute. An analogous
situation is the consumer faced with an increase in utility rates by the use
of the fuel adjustment clause. As the welfare recipient must be afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate misapplication of state power in denying a
statutory benefit, the utility consumer must be afforded the opportunity to
261n Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Supreme Court held that
the termination of utility service without notice and a hearing for nonpayment of service is not
"state action" giving rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). However, the
Court noted that when dealing with an exercise of power which traditionally has been
associated with the state, a finding of state action will be appropriate. Id. at 352-53.
Ratemaking, unlike the termination of utility services, has long been viewed as a state
legislative function which may be delegated and as being subject to the limitations of the due
process clause. For early expressions of this principle, see Brass v. North Dakota ex rel.
Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391 (1894); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877).
In Jackson, the Court further indicated that a utility practice may be state action if the
state puts its "own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it." 419 U.S. at
537. The use of the fuel adjustment clause is ordinarily ordered by the state utility
commission. For examples of such orders, see In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 94 P.U.R. 3d
252 (Calif. 1972); In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 94 P.U.R.3d 417 (Vt. 1972); i re
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 250 (D.C. 1970).
Finally, because Jackson involved the actions of privately owned utility company, its
holding is doubly ianpposite to those publicly owned utilities which operates with a fuel
adjustment clause. Cf. Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976)
(publicly owned and operated utility must meet requirements of the due process clause before
terminating service to a customer).27While the typical application of the fuel adjustment clause is neither fraudulent,
mistaken or unjustified, the potential for abuse clearly does exist where power may be
executed for one's own advantage. It is precisely the prevention of those possible abuses that
the due process clause seeks to ensure. See Rendlemann, The New Due Process: Rights and
Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 536 (1975).2sAn increase in utility rates via the fuel adjustment cause not prompted by a
commensurate increase in the cost of fuel or by an inflationary adjustment is "unfair and
unreasonable" in that the marginal revenues generated by the fuel adjustment surcharge do
not absorb increased fuel costs but rather increase the net revenues of the utility, inflating the
reasonable rate of return allowed the utility by the state regulatory commission.
29397 U.S. 254 (1969).
301d. at 267. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (city ordinance may create
property interest within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment).
1977]
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demonstrate that the proposed increase in rates is unjustified and deprives
him of his statutory interest in fair and reasonable utility rates.
Recent limitations on the Goldberg doctrine indicate that the right to a
hearing is illuminated by reference to the state statutory framework which
created the property interest and particularly by any accompanying
statutory language which prescribes the manner in which the interest is to
be protected or terminated.3 1 The consumer interest in fair and reasonable
rates has typically been created by statute, incident to a general scheme of
regulating utilities and their rates. While these statutes generally do not
explicitly address the use of the fuel adjustment clause, 32 they do provide
that utility rates are to be set pursuant to a hearing.33 The fact that the
entitlement to fair and reasonable rates was created incident to a regulatory
scheme which generally prescribes some form of hearing prior to the
adjustment of utility rates would indicate that the property interest created
is to be adjusted only incident to such a hearing. 34
The consuming public's legal standing with respect to the rate
schedule should not differ significantly from that of the utility's stock-
holders. It is well settled that the utility has a constitutionally cognizable
property interest in the rate schedule which is protected under the due
process clause.35 Since consumers and utilities continue to be viewed as
"adversaries" for the purpose of ratemaking, it would be anomalous to
consider the utility's interest in rate schedules as "property" but to treat the
consuming public's interest in that same rate schedule as something less
than property. 36 Furthermore, the interest in fair and reasonable rates is
comparable to the statutory right to continued utility service, an interest
3 Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) with Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976).32See note 3 supra.
"See note 25 supra & text accompanying.3 4The Supreme Court in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), adopted the view that
while a state may create a property interest, it may also precribe and limit the procedural
incidents which safeguard that property interest. Bishop is inapposite to the adjustment of
utility rates by fuel adjustment clause because, unlike the statutory right involved in Bishop,
the statutes creating the entitlement to fair and reasonable rates are not expressly conditioned
by any procedural limitations. See note 25 supra. Nor can the utility commission limit the
property right created by the state legislature by adopting limited procedural rights without
explicit statutory authority from the state legislature. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
(administrative power to adjust constitutional interests cannot be implied).
S5Because ratemaking may reduce the value of the utility's property, the fourteenth
amendment protects the utility's interest in the adjustment of rates. See, e.g.,.Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. Jackson, 9 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Miss. 1935) (notice and hearing must be
given to the utility before any change in rates); Georgia Power & Light Co. v. Georgia Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 8 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ga. 1934) (unreasonable reduction of utility's rate of
return is denial of property without due process).
S6At least one court has recognized the argument for similar treatment of the utility and
the consumer in ratemaking:
It might be urged with some realism on the side of the consumer that unrea-
sonableness of an order or rate means also one that is confiscatory as to the rate
payer who is forced to pay a rate which is excessive, extortionate or beyond the value
[Vol. 52:637
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which has also been found by several courts to be "property" for due
process purposes.37
The judicial proclivity to label an interest as property has not been
immune to considerations of public policy.3 8 It is certainly proper to
inquire whether the interest sought to be brought within the ambit of the
fourteenth amendment is so important that some form of hearing should be
granted to protect against wrongful deprivation. Here the right to fair and
reasonable utility rates as guaranteed by statute seems no less important
than many of the other interests that have been afforded due process
protection by the courts.3 9 Clearly the fact that utility service has become a
necessity of life for the American consumer is relevant.4 0 The relative
importance of fair and reasonable utility rates becomes even more striking
when the cost of utility service is measured against other household
expenditures. In 1974 the average household spent over six percent of its
budget on utility services; 41 by 1980 utility expenditures in the United
States are expected to reach over $150 billion annually.42 Control over such
of the service rendered .... Under such a rationale the Commission is bound at the
extremes on each side (the rate payer and the utility) by constitutional safeguards
against confiscation, thus giving each the same standards and safeguards.
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indianapolis, 235 Ind. 70, 85 n.l, 131 N.E.2d 308, 314 n.1 (1956)
(emphasis in original).
S7See Condosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 358, 365-66 (D. Vt. 1975);
Donnelly v. City of Eureka, 399 F. Supp. 64, 67-68 (D. Kan. 1975); Limuel v. Southern Union Gas
Co., 378 F. Supp. 964, 966-67 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F.
Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317, 321 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
The Supreme Court has refrained from deciding whether a claim to continued utility
service is property for due process purposes. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 359 (1974).
3'See, e.g., Lines v. Fredricks, 400 U.S. 18 (1970), where the Court refused to label a
bankrupt's unpaid vacation pay as "property" under the Bankruptcy Act and thereby to force
the bankrupt to turn over the vacation pay to the trustee in bankruptcy. In allowing the
bankrupt to retain the pay the Court sought to pursue a policy which gives the bankrupt a
"new opportunity in life and [a] clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt." Id. at 20.
See also, Rendlemann, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531,
558-59 (1975): "In dealing with questionable or hazy state property interests, the social welfare
purpose is an analytical variable with a sounder basis in reality than chameleon conclusions
like possession."
39See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (education); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) (public employment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (household goods); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)
(local access to alcoholic beverages); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950) (trustee accounting).
4 0Utility services have been described by several federal courts as "necessities of life." See,
e.g., Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S.
217, 223 (1917); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 720 (D. Kan. 1972); Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp.
317, 328 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 1
41U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR DECEMBER 1974, at 15 (1975).42For projections of the growth of the utility industry, see Garvin, Electricity: A Vital
Force for Vigorous Growth, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 28, 1974, at 29.
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enormous expenditures cannot, consistently with sound public policy,
escape the protections of the fourteenth amendment.4 3
Admittedly, concluding that consumers do have a cognizable property
interest in the utility rate schedule is not without conceptual difficulty.44
However, by focusing on the state guarantees of fair and reasonable utility
rates and acknowledging the relative importance of utility service in the
modem context, the reach to the protections of the due process clause is not
strained.
How MUCH DUE PROCESS IS DUE?
Once it is established that a cognizable property interest is affected, the
next determination concerns the specific procedures required to protect the
consumers' right to fair and reasonable rates. In making that determi-
nation the focus turns to three factors: the severity of loss incident to the
deprivation of fair and reasonable rates, 45 the weight of governmental and
producer interests justifying either no action or summary action 46 and the
"functional appropriateness" of the procedure for protecting the con-
sumers' interests. 47
The impact upon the consumer from paying excessive utility bills
undoubtedly can be severe. Not only does the excess payment divert
income from the purchase of other necessities, but the additional cost
increases the probability that the consumer will not be able to pay the
43See generally Reich, New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
44Four federal district courts have faced this issue squarely and have unanimously
resolved that the consumer has no property right in existing rate schedules. See Georgia
Power Project v. Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Hardford Consumer
Activists v. Hausman, 381 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1974); Sellers v. Iowa Power & Light Co.,
372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Holt v. Yonce, 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd sum.,
415 U.S. 969 (1975). The courts were also unanimous in their failure to consider the statute as
a source of property interests and in their failure to consider the increasing importance of
utility service to the modern household.
The four holdings may be inapposite for present analysis because they involved
consumer challenges to the practice-of granting interim rate increases pending a full hearing
on the merits for the rate increases. For the purposes of the due process clause, the critical
difference between the interim rate increase and the fuel adjustment clause is that in the
former the full hearing for the consumer is merely delayed, whereas by the nature of the
automatic fuel adjustment clause the consumer never gets his "day in court."45Courts now routinely look to the potential harm to the individual as an initial measure
of the types of procedural protections that must be afforded the individual. See Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) ("procedures
adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge").
46See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974) (state interest in maintaining
the integrity of security interests limits the scope of safeguards); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 787-89 (1973) (state interest'in maintaining the rehabilitative atmosphere in probation
hearings limits the scope of the individual's procedural safeguards); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (state interests may justify the limitation of the hearing to minimum
safeguards).47See generally Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward
Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HAgv. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
[Vol. 52:637
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monthly bill, thereby subjecting him to the termination 48 of an indis-
pensable utility service.49 The potential harm, however, is probably not as
severe as the near total deprivation of household income that was
threatened in Goldberg v. Kelly50 and in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.51 Consequently, the due process model may demand fewer pro-
cedural safeguards in fuel adjustment cases because greater weight will be
accorded to the countervailing state interests in bypassing the normal
panoply of procedural protections.5 2
The state evidences two distinct objectives in the continued use of the
fuel adjustment clause. First, the state utility commission manifests a
concern for the interests of that state's utilities in whose financial stability
the public has a vital stake. The "market" demands that the utility
companies be allowed to increase their prices as their costs of production
increase, thereby maintaining a reasonable rate of return on the share-
holder's investment even in times of inflation. A utility facing net revenue
erosion from increased fuel costs is not an attractive investment or market
risk. Declining utility profits hinder the procurement of the vast sums of
equity and debt financing necessary for the maintenance and expansion of
the utility's power systems.53 Diminishing profits also adversely affect the
utility's credit ratings, which in turn increase the cost of the financing
which is available. These increased costs are eventually borne by the
consumers in the form of higher utility rates.5 4 Hence, by ordering the use
of the fuel adjustment clause, the state is attempting to protect the financial
integrity of the utility in order to insure the longrun maintenance of the
state's utility delivery system at the lowest cost to the consumer.55
48While termination procedures vary considerably among utilities, the usual practice is
that the consumer's service must be terminated eventually if his account remains in arrears.
See Shelton, The Shutoff of Utility Services for Non-Payment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 745 (1971).
Nor is the consumer entitled to a hearing before his service is terminated. Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
"See note 40 supra.
50397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51395 U.S: 337 (1969). Sniadach held that a debtor's wages could not be garnished in the
absence of procedures consistent with the due process clause because such garnishment
imposes a "tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support." Id. at 340.
S2Although the "balancing test" articulated in Sniadach and Goldberg has been
somewhat limited by the later analysis in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the state's interest in relieving itself of administrative
burdens necessarily enters into the analysis. See Note, Specifying the Procedure Required by
Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (due process analysis requries
consideration of fiscal and administrative burdens that the procedural requirement would
entail).
5sUnited Gas Pipeline Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 113(1958).
54Shiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PuB.
UTiL FORT., June 19, 1975, at 25.
5sSee Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 964
(1958). See also United Gas Pipeline v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103
(1958).
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Second, the use of the fuel adjustment clause also helps to minimize
state administrative burdens. Given the frequent adjustment in rate
schedules associated with rapidly rising fuel prices, formal ratemaking
hearings in place of the automatic adjustments would probably require
most states to expand their utility regulatory staffs.56 Where the fuel
adjustment clause operates outside the regulatory process, its use cuts
regulatory expenses and decreases the frequency with which both the state
and the utility must prepare for the more expensive formal rate pro-
ceedings.
To suggest that the state has an interest, even a strong interest, in the
continuation of the fuel adjustment clause outside the regulatory process is
not, of course, dispositive of the consumer's due process interests. 57
Substantive and administrative interests of a state in the maintenance of a
given procedure are not sufficient justifications for failing to provide a
hearing on matters of such importance to the individual; 8 the weight of
state interests merely shapes the form that the hearing will take. What the
fourteenth amendment demands is that the state provide a procedural
model that is functionally appropriate for protecting the legitimate
interests of the individual and that accommodates governmental interests
without sacrificing the individual's "day in court." The procedure
suggested below seeks to find that balance.
A SUMMARY HEARING MODEL
The consumer's interest in the ratemaking process is limited to
insuring that only fair and reasonable rates are maintained by the utility
and the state.59 Only if the fuel adjustment is mistakenly or fraudulently
56Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 25.
57Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (administrative convenience alone does not
justify an irrebuttable presumption); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statutory preference of a
class of persons in order to eliminate the need for a hearing is the type of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the fourteenth amendment).
58The lesson of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), and Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972), is that absent "unusual or emergency circumstances" the determination as
to the necessity of the change in status quo must be made incident to a hearing. It is unlikely
that the steady inflation of fuel costs creates such an emergency as to justify the abandonment
of the administrative process. The justification for wholely summary action lies in the
necessity to act immediately, and its use has been limited to prevention of such evils as
epidemics, distribution of putrid foods or adulterated drugs, the sale of worthless securities
and the conduct of bank officers which might jeopardize the interests of depositors. See
Freedman, Summary Actions by Administrative Agencies, 50 CHI. L. REv. 1 (1972). When the
utility faces an actual emergency because of a sudden erosion of its profits due to increased
costs, most states have provided a special procedure for interim relief where rates are increased
pending a full hearing on the merits. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 8-1-2-113 (1976). Yet even the
change of rates in an "emergency" is not immune to the requirements of an adequate hearing.
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indianapolis Rys., 225 Ind. 30, 72 N.E.2d 434 (1947). For the
distinction between fuel adjustment and interim rates as it affects the due process analysis, see
note 44 supra.
59See notes 27-28 supra & text accompanying.
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applied by the utility can unfair and unreasonable rates result from its use.
Consequently, the consumer's interest is adequately protected by insuring
that no mistake or fraud occurs in the fuel adjustment clause. 60
The procedural device necessary to prevent the evils of mistake and
fraud is the pre-rate increase hearing before the state utility commission,
limited in scope to the sole issue of fuel cost adjustment. 61 The hearing
should be held on the record after notice and an opportunity for
participation has been given to all interested parties. The opportunity for
participation means that the consumer or his representative should be
given the right to inspect the evidence offered by the utility and to cross-
examine the witnesses of the utility. The opportunity to cross-examine the
utility witnesses could expose any attempt by the utility to misuse the fuel
adjustment process by purchasing fuel from a subsidiary at an artificially
high price and then attempting to pass that price on the the consumer.
Cross-examination would also reduce the utility's opportunity to pass
improper, extraneous costs that were not intended to be incorporated into
the fuel adjustment process. 62  Concomitantly the consumer must be
allowed to offer evidence in rebuttal or in explanation of his interest.
63
Resort to these devices should decrease the possibility that error will occur
in the use of the fuel adjustment clause to increase utility rates. 64
CONCLUSION
The due process clause protects not only traditional property interests
but also shelters modern interests and rights that are valuable to the
individual. Given the growing importance that utility service plays in the
American household, the statutory right to fair and reasonable utility rates
is no less deserving of procedural protection than many of the consumer
6OSee notes 48-49 supra & text accompanying.
61The Indiana legislature, in response to criticism of the automatic nature of the fuel
adjustment clause, amended the regulatory procedure to require summary hearings before the
fuel adjustment rate becomes effective. Before the hearing the public counselor is empowered
to examine the books of the petitioning utility and oppose any increase thought to be
unjustified. Presumably a consumer may participate in the summary hearings. See IND.
CODE § 8-1-2-46(b) (1976). There is no requirement that a record of the proceeding be kept.62For example, in 1974 one electric utility used the automatic fuel adjustment procedure
to improperly pass on $1.8 million of expenses. See Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An
Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 19, 1975, at 27. Had a hearing
been held prior to the adjustment of the rates, the utility commission could have discovered
that the utility was improperly passing on costs other than those incurred for fuel.
6sCf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 160
(1972).
64t has been a long-standing judicial assumption that this model of fact-finding is the
superior form of ascertaining the truth and reducing the incidence of error. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160-84 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring).
For a complete discussion of the values served by adversary hearings, see Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J.
319 (1957).
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interests which have found constitutional protection in Goldberg v. Kelly6
and its progeny. Accordingly, before utility rates may be increased
consistent with the limitations of the due process clause, the consumer or
his representative must first be provided with the opportunity to challenge
the increase.
It is quite likely that with the frequent need to resort to fuel
adjustment, very few consumers will avail themselves of the opportunity to
challenge their public utility in such a proceeding. 66 Consumers, however,
are not without their representatives in utility matters. The public
counselor, 67 the state attorney general's office, 68 large industrial con-
sumers69 and public interest groups70 are all potential participants in the
fuel adjustment hearings. Moreover, the mere fact that one may choose not
to exercise procedural protections afforded by the due process clause is no
justification for withholding the opportunity to exercise those rights.
Furthermore, the possibility that the utility may be called upon to support
the increase in rates factually and may be subject to cross-examination will
induce it to come prepared to offer the most accurate and complete
information available concerning changes in the cost of fuel, regardless of
the fact that consumer participation is not routine.
Requiring summary hearings before allowing rate changes caused by
fuel cost increases does not interfere with the promotion of the govern-
mental interests discussed earlier. 71  Legitimate increases in fuel costs
continue to be passed to the consumer with only a short delay caused by the
hearing. The financial integrity of utilities will not be undercut by this
65397 U.s. 254 (1957).
66Given the number and diversity of the consumer's interests in other goods and services,
it is unlikely that the monthly adjustment of rates, to which the consumer may have already
become "desensitized," will generate sufficient concern to mobilize him to participate in the
hearing. But even assuming that some consumers will be so motivated, they likely will lack
the requisite expertise for participation in the hearing in a meaningful fashion. To effectively
cross-examine the utility witness, one must be conversant with accounting principles as well
as be capble of reading and understanding fuel purchase contracts. Further, the likelihood of
individual consumer participation is diminished by a cost barrier to the extent that effective
participation requires the employment of any attorney or an accountant.67Some states provide for a public officer to represent consumer interests in rate
proceedings before the state utility commission. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 8-1-1-4 (1976); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 48: 2-31-1 (1969).68The attorney general's office in a number of states has been active in proceedings
before the state utility commission. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, - Fla.
- , 257 So.2d 891 (1972); In re Massachusetts Elec. Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 65 (Penn. 1975).69Because rate hikes increase their cost of production, many industrial users or their
associations have opted to oppose rate increases. See, e.g., In re Southern Natural Gas Co., 12
P.U.R.4th 119 (F.P.C. 1975); Ex parte Alabama Textile Mfrs. Ass'n, 238 Ala. 228, 215 So.2d 447
(1968); In re Michigan Power Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 139 (Mich. 1975).70For examples of consumer group participation in rate proceedings, see Citizens for
Allegan County v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Southern California Edison Co.,
100 P.U.R. 3d 257 (Calif. 1973); In re Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc., 8 P.U.R. 4th 475
(N.Y. 1975) (over twenty interest groups intervening).
71See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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delay of a few days or weeks.72 While the hearing undoubtedly will add
administrative expenses, the fact that the hearings are summary73 in nature
and limited in scope to a single issue should keep the incremental costs
minimal. 74
In assessing the costs and benefits associated with the procedure one
must also consider the manner in which the procedure advances the
integrity of the administrative process.7 5 Any increase in utility rates in the
absence of an opportunity for participation by the public or of scrutiny by
the state commission that was established to regulate utility matters offers
an appearance of unfaimess.7 6 This abdication of public control over
utility rate increases certainly raises fears that the power to set utility rates
will be exercised not in the public interest, but rather in the private
interests of the utility.77 In fact, such criticisms and suspicions have been
suggested by actions taken by consumer groups and the Federal Trade
Commission.78 Although the continued adjustment of rates in response to
72The adverse effect of regulatory lag is most acute where the cost of production is rising
rapidly and it is months or years before a new rate schedule is approved by the utility
commission to reflect the changed economic circumstances. Most commissions cushion the
rate schedule so that the utility may incur increased costs for a short period before its earnings
will farr below the market's minimum permissible rate of return. Hence, while the short delay
may erode the commission approved rate of return, the utility's earnings should not fall
significantly before rate relief via the fuel adjustment procedure is approved.
7"The hearings are "summary" in the sense that not all the incidents of a full scale
adversary hearing need be afforded to the consumer. For example, the consumer may have
limited rights of discovery, there may be no power to subpoena witnesses, the rules of evidence
may be relaxed, and the practice of granting a stay of decision pending judicial review need
not be followed.714Unlike other administrtive contexts in which the introduction of the due process model
would be novel, state utility commissions have long operated in a framework of procedural
due process in ratemaking. Hence, due process in fuel adjustment will not.import the costs of
unfamiliarity. The administrative cost argument is further undercut by the fact that utility
regulatory costs are generally borne by the consumers-the very class that benefits from the
process. For example, the costs Of utility regulation in Indiana are financed by a special fee
assessed against the utilities operating within the state. The fee is an operating expense that is
recovered by the utility through higher rates. IND. CODE § 8-1-6-1 (1976).
7SSee generally Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1041 (1975).
16On the responsibility of the state utility commission to pursue the public interest, see J.
BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 26-41 (1961).
77See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84 (1960).
78A leading consumer periodical has expressed concern that the fuel adjustment clause is
being used by some utilities to buy fuel from themselves at artifically high prices and to pass
those prices on to the consumer, thereby making an extra profit through a fuel supplying
subsidiary not subject to regulation. The Fuel Adjustment Caper, 39 CONSUMER REP. 837
(1974).
The Federal Trade Commission has begun a "secret" investigation of the use of the fuel
adjustment clause. The Commission has subpoenaed considerable information from nine
utilities concerning,
the structure, operations, and effect of a fuel adjustment clause including infor-
mation on sales, or negotiations for sales of fuel to utilities, purchases or
negotiations for purchase of fuel by utilities, ownership of fuel reserves and
production facilities by a utility, and all related matters for the purpose of the
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fuel cost changes serves the public interest, 79 the benefit will be lost if the
public, believing that utilities are misusing the fuel adjustment clause,
successfully force legislation which would prevent its use. 80 While there is
litle evidence to suggest that the fuel adjustment clause has, in fact, been
misused by any utility, it is the potential for misuse81 that generates the
concern. 2 The use of pre-rate increase hearings in connection with fuel
adjustment should alleviate many of these concerns and thereby serve to
enhance the integrity of the administrative process by restoring public
confidence in the procedure used to increase utility rates.83 If the state
utility commissions expect, as they must, to allow utility rates to rise in
response to continued inflation and capital expansion, it is imperative that
the public maintain confidence in that administrative process.84
RANDELL OGG
development of a comprehensive study of the energy industry.
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 27, 1975, at 14.
"See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
8Senator Lee Metcalf, a long time critic of the fuel adjustment clause, has proposed
legislation to prohibit its use by state regulatory commissions. A bill to restrict the use of fuel
adjustment clauses was also put before the Indiana legislature. See INDIANA SENATE JOURNAL 125
(1972).
81Potential "misuses" include inadvertant miscalculations of fuel costs which generate a
surcharge in excess of the incremental fuel costs to the utility, intentional misrepresentations
of the cost of fuel and inclusion of extraneous items in the fuel adjustment clause. See Schiffel,
Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, PUB. UTi-. FORT., June
19, 1975, at 27.82The decision to implement fuel adjustment is made in an institutional context and
consequently is not immune to the observation that decisionmaking is often infected with bias
or at least the appearance of bias arising from the particular institutional structure. See
McCormack, The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for Judicial Review?, 52
TEXAS L. REv. 1257 (1974).
83The emergence of individuals and groups willing to assist administrative
agencies in identifying interests deserving protection, in producing relevant
evidence and argument suggesting appropriate action, and in closing the gap
between the agencies and their ultimate constituents presents an opportunity to
improve the administrative process.
Gelhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 403 (1972).
84That the administrative agency is less effective when it lacks public confidence is the
conslusion of more than one student of administrative agencies. See, e.g., Freedman, Crisis
and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1041 (1975).
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